



Attribute-Based Access Control Models

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
> Colorado State University Fort Collins Sept. 16, 2014

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Cyber Security Technologies





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- Analog Hole
- Inference
- Covert Channels
- Side Channels
- Phishing
- Safety
- Usability
- Privacy
- Attack Asymmetry
- Compatibility
- Federation








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

















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






- Discretionary Access Control (DAC), 1970
 - Owner controls access
 - But only to the original, not to copies
 - Grounded in pre-computer policies of researchers
- Mandatory Access Control (MAC), 1970
 - Synonymous to Lattice-Based Access Control (LBAC)
 - Access based on security labels
 - ✤ Labels propagate to copies
 - Grounded in pre-computer military and national security policies
- Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), 1995
 - Access based on roles
 - Can be configured to do DAC or MAC
 - Grounded in pre-computer enterprise policies

Numerous other models but only 3 successes: SO FAR




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RBAC96 Model









- > RBAC can be configured to do MAC
- RBAC can be configured to do DAC
- RBAC is policy neutral

RBAC is neither MAC nor DAC!






- Role granularity is not adequate leading to role explosion
 - Researchers have suggested several extensions such as parameterized privileges, role templates, parameterized roles (1997-)
- Role design and engineering is difficult and expensive
 - Substantial research on role engineering top down or bottom up (1996-), and on role mining (2003-)
- Assignment of users/permissions to roles is cumbersome
 - Researchers have investigated decentralized administration (1997-), attribute-based implicit user-role assignment (2002-), role-delegation (2000-), role-based trust management (2003-), attribute-based implicit permission-role assignment (2012-)
- Adjustment based on local/global situational factors is difficult
 Temporal (2001-) and spatial (2005-) extensions to RBAC proposed
- RBAC does not offer an extension framework
 - Every shortcoming seems to need a custom extension
 - Can ABAC unify these extensions in a common open-ended framework?



Security Architect




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Access Control Models






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Access Control Models










- Attributes are name:value pairs
 - possibly chained
 - values can be complex data structures
- Associated with
 - ✤ users
 - ✤ subjects
 - ✤ objects
 - contexts
 - device, connection, location, environment, system ...
- Converted by policies into rights just in time
 - policies specified by security architects
 - attributes maintained by security administrators
 - ordinary users morph into architects and administrators
- Inherently extensible



ABAC Status





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- > X.509, SPKI Attribute Certificates (1999 onwards)
 - ✤ IETF RFCs and drafts
 - Tightly coupled with PKI (Public-Key Infrastructure)
- > XACML (2003 onwards)
 - OASIS standard
 - Narrowly focused on particular policy combination issues
 - Fails to accommodate the ANSI-NIST RBAC standard model
 - Fails to address user subject mapping
- Usage Control or UCON (Park-Sandhu 2004)
 - Fails to address user subject mapping
 - Focus is on extended features
 - Mutable attributes
 - Continuous enforcement
 - Obligations
 - Conditions
- Several others






> An ABAC model requires

- identification of policy configuration points (PCPs)
- Ianguages and formalisms for each PCP
- A core set of PCPs can be discovered by building the ABACα model to unify DAC, MAC and RBAC
- > Additional ABAC models can then be developed by
 - $\boldsymbol{\bigstar}$ increasing the sophistication of the ABAC PCPs
 - discovering additional PCPs driven by requirements beyond DAC, MAC and RBAC

A small but crucial step




ABACa Model Structure



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ABACa Model Structure




Can be configured to do DAC, MAC, RBAC

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Examples




 2. Subject attribute constraints policy are different at creation and modification time.

OASIS-RBAC

1. Context Attributes

- Prerequisite role
- Initial role assignment constraints
- Other role assignment constraints




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 $ABAC_{\beta}$ Model









- GURA model for user-attribute assignment
- > Safety analysis of ABAC_{α} and ABAC_{β}
- Undecidable safety for ABAC models
- Decidable safety for ABAC with finite fixed attributes
- Constraints in ABAC
- > ABAC Cloud IaaS implementations (OpenStack)
- Attribute Engineering
- > Attribute Mining
- Unification of Attributes, Relationships and Provenance